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Improvements in environmental quality depend in large measure on changes in 
private sector management.  In recognition of this fact, government and industry have 
begun in recent years to focus directly on shaping the internal management practices of 
private firms.  New management-based strategies can take many forms, but unlike 
conventional regulatory approaches they are linked by their distinctive focus on 
management practices, rather than on environmental technologies or emissions targets.  
This article offers the first sustained analysis of both public and private sector initiatives 
designed specifically to improve firms’ environmental management.  Synthesizing the 
results of a conference of leading scholars and policymakers organized by the Regulatory 
Policy Program at Harvard University, we consider in this article whether management-
based strategies can lead to improved environmental outcomes and, if so, how they 
should be designed to be most effective.  We report research findings showing that 
management-based strategies can yield improvements in industry’s environmental 
performance, indicating that anyone concerned about environmental quality should 
seriously consider the use of these strategies.   Nevertheless, we urge caution about 
overstating what can be accomplished through management-based strategies, as they will 
not always lead to significant change in private sector firms’ environmental performance.  
Although management-based strategies deserve greater consideration because they can 
yield positive results, these results are unlikely to be significant or reliable enough to 
make such strategies the mainstay of society’s approach to environmental protection. 
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Improvements in environmental quality depend in large measure on decisions 
made by private-sector managers.  For decades, government regulators and others 
interested in environmental protection tried to affect these decisions by altering 
incentives so that businesses would achieve a desired level of emissions or would adopt 
specified pollution control technologies.  While these traditional performance-based and 
technology-based regulatory strategies have worked well to spur private managers to 
make the investments needed to reduce some of their firms’ negative environmental 
impacts,1 they have tended to treat the firm itself as a “black box,” imposing requirements 
                                                 
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Associate Professor of Public Policy 
and Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.  
** Director, Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. We 
acknowledge support from the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, American Chemistry Council, Resources for the Future/RFF Press, the Multi-State Working 
Group Policy Academy, and the Center for Business and Government at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government.  We also appreciate research assistance by Ben Gerber and helpful comments from Terry 
Davies, Donald Elliott, and Tom Lyon.  This article represents the authors’ synthesis of the perspectives 
that emerged at a workshop sponsored by the Regulatory Policy Program and does not necessarily reflect 
the views of all the workshop participants.  In order to facilitate open dialogue at the workshop, discussion 
was held on a not-for-attribution basis, so statements and ideas contained in this article are for that reason 
not identified here with the names of specific workshop participants. For the benefit of the reader, we have 
added footnotes where appropriate, pointing to relevant literature that supports or complements ideas that 
emerged during the workshop discussion.  In addition, the appendix to this article contains a list of all the 
individuals who participated in the workshop.
1 See generally J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, INDUSTRY INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPROVEMENT: AN EVALUATION OF US FEDERAL INITIATIVES (1996) (Report to the Global Environmental 
Management Initiative); DEREK BOK, THE STATE OF THE NATION: GOVERNMENT AND THE QUEST FOR A 
BETTER SOCIETY (1996). 
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for specific means or outcomes without regard for the overall way that firms manage their 
environmental impacts.2
More recently, both government and industry have begun to explore innovative 
alternatives that seek directly to shape the internal management practices of private firms.  
Rather than treating private firms as proverbial black boxes, these new strategies focus 
squarely on management and seek to provide incentives for firms to develop management 
practices that in turn can lead to improved environmental outcomes.  Government and the 
private sector are using management-based strategies to address a broad range of 
environmental concerns.  For example, in Massachusetts, the legislature has attempted to 
reduce the risks from toxic chemicals not by requiring managers of manufacturing 
facilities to meet emissions limits or to install pollution control technology, but instead by 
requiring them to engage in management effort to develop toxic use reduction plans.3  
Similarly, U.S. automakers require their suppliers to adopt environmental management 
systems as a requirement for doing business,4 and the American Forest and Paper 
Association requires its members to adopt a set of management practices directed toward 
sustainable forestry.5
Decision makers in government and the private sector are turning to management-
based strategies for several reasons.  These strategies take advantage of the fact that 
                                                 
2 JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2003) 
(“[E]nvironmental law as a whole treats factories as giant black boxes, refusing to look at what happens 
inside.”) 
3 Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 21I. 
4 Press Release, Ford Motor Company, Ford Becomes First U.S. Automaker to Require Suppliers to 
Achieve ISO 14001 Certification (Sept. 21, 1999) (on file with author); Press Release, General Motors 
Corporation, General Motors Sets New Level of Environmental Performance for Suppliers (Sept. 21, 1999) 
(on file with author); see also R.C. Wilson, Ford Spreads the Word about Its EMS Success, 33 POLLUTION 
ENGINEERING 6 (2001). 
5 Errol Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 239 
(2003); Jennifer Nash, Industry Codes of Practice: Emergence and Evolution, in NEW TOOLS FOR 
2 
 
private-sector managers have the best knowledge about how to bring about appropriate 
changes within their organizations and industries.6  Management-based strategies seek to 
leverage the private sector’s informational advantage by encouraging managers to 
identify and reduce their facilities’ most significant impacts.  Interest in management-
based strategies is also fueled by the perception that conventional regulatory strategies 
may be ill suited for addressing the environmental problems most vexing to policy 
makers today.  For example, problems such as chemical accidents, which are often the 
result of dynamic interactions inside organizations, are not easy for regulators to solve 
using technology- or performance-based tools.7  A management-based strategy that 
requires managers to identify sources of risk, develop a plan for addressing them, and 
monitor the implementation of their plans might be a more effective approach.  Finally, 
people are turning to management-based strategies simply out of growing acceptance that 
what goes on inside the black box of the firm is of critical importance for overall 
environmental quality.  The size of a firm’s environmental footprint is not pre-determined 
by the raw materials it uses and the products or services it produces.  Firms working in 
the same sector – and subject to the same competitive and regulatory pressures – can 
have starkly different environmental profiles depending on how they are managed. 
To explore the promise and the performance of management-based strategies for 
environmental improvement, the Regulatory Policy Program at the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard University organized a research conference that 
                                                                                                                                                 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  EDUCATION, INFORMATION, AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES 235, 237 
(Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern eds., 2002). 
6 Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 695 (2003) (management-based approaches “place 
responsibility for [decision making] with those who possess the most information about risks and potential 
control methods.”).  
7 CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984). 
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brought together some of the nation’s leading scholars as well as leaders from 
government, business, and non-governmental organizations.  The conference aimed to 
evaluate experiences with management-based strategies and draw lessons for future 
public and private sector developments.  This article synthesizes and extends central 
themes and issues that emerged from the conference discussion and highlights unresolved 
issues that merit further research.   
We begin by defining what we mean by management-based strategies and 
offering examples of their use by both the public and private sectors.  We then turn to the 
role of management in organizations and explore the issue of how much management 
affects environmental performance compared with other social, economic, and regulatory 
variables.  We then consider four empirical studies of the impact of different applications 
of management-based strategies.  The results of this research suggest that management-
based strategies can sometimes play a role in bringing about improvements in firms’ 
environmental performance.  To be sure, the effectiveness of management-based 
strategies is by no means assured or always significant; their success depends on the 
conditions under which they are used as well as the way that they are designed.  
Important design considerations include the incentives that are offered; whether the 
strategy seeks to promote management planning by itself or also the implementation of 
plans; the specificity of any standards for management practices; the amount and type of 
information collected by the firm and shared with outsiders; the role of auditing; and the 
nature and level of stakeholder involvement.  We conclude by examining the question of 
when management-based strategies are likely to be more effective than traditional 
performance- and technology-based approaches. 
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What are Management-Based Strategies? 
Management refers to the coordination of an organization’s operational activities 
toward a specified set of objectives.8  It includes practices such as planning, goal setting, 
staffing, training, analysis, and control.  Such management practices have long been used 
by businesses and are by now ubiquitous throughout industry.  Every day, private sector 
managers use planning, monitoring, analysis, training, and control to achieve business 
objectives such as improving the efficiency of their operations or the quality of their 
products and services.  
What we call management-based strategies are attempts to require or encourage a 
set of targeted firms or organizations to use basic management practices in ways that 
align their actions and outcomes with broader social objectives.  Management-based 
strategies, as we define them, are used by those outside an organization to change the 
management practices and behaviors of those on the inside.  Government regulators, for 
example, have used management-based strategies in a variety of important areas, 
including pharmaceuticals, food safety, and health care institutions.9  In the 
                                                 
8 MORGAN WIZEL, MANAGEMENT: THE BASICS (2004). 
9 In its regulation of the quality of pharmaceuticals, the FDA is moving toward a management-based 
framework called the “Pharmaceutical Current Good Manufacturing Practice,” which when finalized will 
seek to encourage industry managers to implement systems to identify, analyze, fix, and prevent quality 
problems.  U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Pharmaceutical cGMPs for the 21st Century – A Risk-
Based Approach, Final Report,  available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/gmp/gmp2004/GMP_finalreport2004.htm.  FDA and the USDA are also using a 
management-based strategy to improve the safety of juice, seafood, and meat by requiring firms to 
implement a system called Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP) to identify and control 
pathogens.  FDA, Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 
6137 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 21 CFR Part 120); FDA, Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary 
Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products. 60 Fed. Reg. 65095 (Dec. 18, 1995) (to be codified 
at 21 CFR Parts 123 and 1240); USDA, Final Rule on Pathogen Reduction and HACCP Systems, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 38,806 (1996).  The accreditation standards for hospitals have become similarly management-based.  
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Hospital Patient Safety Standards (July 1, 
2001), available at http://www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/perspectives. 
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environmental domain, both government agencies and various private sector institutions 
are using management-based strategies to achieve a broad range of objectives.  Examples 
include: 
• Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have adopted management-based 
regulations in an effort to prevent catastrophic accidents at facilities that use large 
quantities of hazardous chemicals.10  Under these rules, industrial facilities must 
engage in a risk assessment of their operations, develop procedures designed to 
prevent accidents, and seek to make continuous improvements in the management 
of their operations.11   
• The EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track, the agency’s flagship 
voluntary environmental program, recognizes and rewards firms that have met 
regulatory requirements, implemented environmental management systems, and 
set goals for making further environmental improvements.12  Several states, 
including Texas and Virginia, have adopted similar programs.13 
• The American Chemistry Council requires chemical manufacturing firms to 
implement a Responsible Care management system and have it externally verified 
                                                                                                                                                 
asp?durki=2973&site=10&return=2897; see generally TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, 
NEW RULES : REGULATION, MARKETS, AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1995). 
10 Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,356 (Feb. 24, 1992) (to be 
codified at 29 CFR Part 1910); Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 31,668-01 
(June 20, 1996) (to be codified at 40 CFR); see generally Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6, at 698-99. 
11 Id. 
12 See generally, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK, BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION, 
PERFORMANCE TRACK SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT (2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/PT_2nd_progress_rpt_FINAL.pdf.  
13 Memorandum of Agreement between the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (Apr. 24, 2002), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/states/programs/va_moa.pdf; Memorandum of Agreement between 
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as a condition for membership. Managers must implement management practices 
to engage the community, prevent pollution, and operate their plants safely, 
among other objectives.14   
• The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has developed an 
environmental management system standard, known as ISO 14001, that facilities 
anywhere in the world can use as a guide for managing their environmental 
impacts.  ISO 14001 calls for facilities to develop a system for setting their own 
firm-specific environmental performance goals, and then for assessing progress 
and correcting problems.15   
As these examples show, management-based strategies can take a wide variety of 
forms and can be adopted by a variety of organizations, including government agencies, 
trade associations, and other standard-setting bodies.  Nevertheless, they share in 
common a clear focus on management itself.  They all directly seek to influence the 
attention, information, authority, and financial resources of managers toward the 
achievement of environmental improvements, but without necessarily requiring them to 
achieve any specific outcomes and while also giving them the flexibility to choose their 
own measures to reduce their environmental impacts.  
Management-based strategies can be classified into four types, depending on what 
kind of institution uses them and the types of incentives that accompany them.  We 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/states/programs/tx_moa.pdf. 
14 Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical 
Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT J. 698, 699-700 (2000).   
15 Jennifer Nash et. al., ISO 14001 and EPA’s Region I’s Startrack Program, in RESEARCH PAPERS 2, VOL. 
1 OF ENVIRONMENT: TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 15-17; Jerry 
Speir, EMSs and Tiered Regulation: Getting the Deal Right, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, 198, 217 
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) (“ISO 14001 guarantees no particular level of performance, 
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distinguish between management-based strategies deployed by governmental and non-
governmental institutions.  We then distinguish between management-based strategies 
that mandate management practices and those that encourage the adoption of improved 
environmental management.  These two distinctions lead to the typology of management-
based strategies shown in Figure 1.  When a government agency such as the U.S. EPA 
requires a business to strengthen its internal management, it is engaging in management-
based regulation.  When a private organization such as a firm or trade association 
imposes a similar requirement on its suppliers or members, it is issuing a management-
based mandate.  When government establishes a program to coax (but not require) firms 
to improve their environmental management, it uses management-based incentives.  
When a private organization initiates a similar effort to encourage others to improve their 
management, it is creating management-based pressure. 
In these various ways, governmental and non-governmental institutions are 
increasingly requiring or encouraging firms to improve their internal management 
practices as a way to improve their environmental performance.  But are these 
management-based strategies in fact affecting the environmental performance of 
companies?  Why should anyone expect that management-based strategies would lead 
firms to reduce their environmental footprints? 
                                                                                                                                                 
and without supplementation, it provides no public information by which to judge an organizations 
performance.”). 
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Figure 1.  Types of Management-Based Strategies 
 
 Governmental User 
 
Non-Governmental User 
 
 
 
 
Management 
Required 
 
Management-based  
regulation 
 
Examples:   
• Risk management planning 
required under Clean Air Act 
§ 112(r)16 
• Massachusetts Toxics Use 
Reduction Act17 
 
 
 
Management-based  
mandate 
 
Examples:   
• American Chemistry Council’s 
Responsible Care Program18 
• Ford Motor Company’s 
requirement that suppliers 
become certified to ISO 1400119 
 
 
 
 
 
Management 
Encouraged 
 
Management-based  
incentive 
 
Examples: 
• U.S. EPA’s National 
Environmental Performance 
Track20 
• Texas Natural Resource 
Conservation Commission’s 
Clean Texas Program21 
 
 
 
Management-based  
pressure 
 
Examples: 
• Portland Cement Association’s 
Cement Manufacturing 
Sustainability Program22 
• International Organization for 
Standardization’s (ISO) 14001 
Standard23 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
17 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
18 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
19 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
20 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
21 Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission Clean Texas Program, available at 
http://www.cleantexas.org/. 
22 Press Release, Portland Cement Association, Cement Industry Adopts Environmental Management 
Systems (August 5, 2004) available at http://www.cement.org/newsroom/ems20040805.asp; Cement 
Manufacturing Sustainability Program Plans for Future Generations available at 
http://www.cement.org/bookstore/profile.asp?store=&pagenum=1&pos=0&catID=&id=5728. 
23 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14001 – ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS – SPECIFICATION WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE (1996). 
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Does Management Matter? 
In order for management-based strategies to work, management itself must be an 
important factor causally related to environmental outcomes.  Is management the right 
place to look for improvements in environmental performance?  How much does 
management matter?  The opening session of the Regulatory Policy Program’s 
conference addressed these initial questions. 
The session began with a presentation by Robert A. Kagan, of the University of 
California, Berkeley, in which he reported findings from a study of pulp and paper mills 
in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.24  Kagan and his research 
collaborators found that firms exhibited different management styles reflecting managers’ 
attitudes towards environmental issues, their responsiveness to various pressures for 
environmental improvement, and the steps they took to implement environmental 
policies.  Kagan classified firms’ environmental management styles into five ideal 
types.25  These ideal types include, on one end of the spectrum, the “true believers” who 
voluntarily invest in state-of-the-art practices and actively search for ways to improve 
their performance even beyond what they are required to do by law.  At the other end of 
the spectrum lie “environmental laggards” who resist even complying with their basic 
legal obligations.  In between these two extremes are “environmental strategists,” 
“committed compliers,” and “reluctant compliers,” each of whom have varying degrees 
of commitment to excellence in managing their operations in ways that go beyond what 
they are required to do by law. 
                                                 
24 See Robert A. Kagan, Environmental Management Style and Corporate Environmental Performance, in 
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE  (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005); see also ROBERT A KAGAN, ET 
AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT  (2003). 
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Kagan has found that management style is an important factor influencing 
environmental performance.  Not surprisingly, true believers and environmental 
strategists achieve better environmental results than those that do not comply with 
regulations or only comply reluctantly.  Firms that are committed and systematic about 
managing their environmental impacts tend to perform better in terms of their impact on 
environmental quality than firms that are not so managed, all other things being equal. 
 Of course, all other things are not always equal.  Firms’ environmental 
performance is affected by more than just management style.  Both performance and style 
itself can be affected by community demands, regulatory enforcement, and economic 
considerations, such as the financial strength of the company or its customers’ demands 
for environmental quality.  The importance of these factors was confirmed not only by 
the Kagan study of pulp and paper facilities, but also by the findings from an extensive 
statistical analysis presented at the conference by Paul R. Kleindorfer, of the University 
of Pennsylvania.26  Drawing on an analysis of nearly 2,000 chemical accidents at more 
than 15,000 chemical facilities, Kleindorfer reported that economic, regulatory, and 
community factors are all important drivers of accident and injury rates in this important 
industrial sector.27
The research presented at the conference highlighted three important, but as yet 
unanswered, questions that hold clear implications for understanding and use of 
management-based strategies.  First, why do firms vary in their environmental 
management style?  In other words, why are some managers true believers or 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Id. 
26 See Paul R. Kleindorfer, The RMP Rule and Management-Based Regulations, in LEVERAGING THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005). 
11 
 
environmental strategists who treat environmental management as a high priority, while 
others are only reluctant compliers?  This is a crucial question for anyone interested in 
management-based strategies, since such strategies aim at improving firms’ 
environmental management.  One answer, of course, is that the enforcement of old-style 
regulations affects managers’ environmental priorities and commitment.  Although 
traditional regulation may treat firms as black boxes, it nevertheless provides strong 
incentives for firms to improve their environmental management.  Some firms that are 
now widely perceived to be environmental leaders were previously the targets of major 
regulatory enforcement actions that helped their managers “wake up” to environmental 
aspects of their operations.28   
Participants mentioned a range of additional factors that may explain why some 
firms take environmental management more seriously than others.  These factors include: 
the personal beliefs of corporations’ top managers; the social pressures that they face in 
their personal lives or in their communities, including the impact of consumer boycotts or 
community protests; the strategic position firms face within their sectors; and the extent 
to which firms’ managers believe there is a strong business case for sound environmental 
management.29  A few participants expressed the view that management style is largely 
idiosyncratic, determined mainly by who is sitting at the top of a company’s hierarchy 
and what that person figuratively “had for lunch” on any given day. 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy 
Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, 1, 2 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) (discussing 
“[t]he experience of the Louisiana-Pacific Corporation”). 
29 For general discussion of such factors, see KAGAN ET AL., supra note 24; ASEEM PRAKASH, GREENING OF 
THE FIRM: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM (2000); FOREST REINHARDT, DOWN TO 
EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1999). 
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Second, what is the relative importance of each of the social, economic, 
regulatory, and management factors that affect firms’ environmental performance?  
While conference participants recognized that each of these types of factors shapes 
managers’ actions, some factors are likely to be more important than others.  A few 
conference participants expressed the view that an often unobservable factor – managers’ 
attitudes or commitment – might be the most important factor because it not only directly 
affects the seriousness of a firm’s management practices, but it may also serve as a filter 
through which managers and their employees differentially perceive the impact of the 
other factors, such as community, regulatory, and financial pressures.   An important but 
still unresolved issue for research will be to assess the degree to which management 
practices and managers’ commitment independently contribute as much as other factors 
do to a firm’s environmental performance. 
Finally, how should researchers study the role of management in shaping firms’ 
environmental performance?  Several participants noted the need to develop reliable 
ways of defining and measuring management in concrete terms using observable 
characteristics so that researchers can test for correlation between management and 
environmental performance.  Without such measures, it is easy to conflate managers’ 
attitudes and their actions in describing firms’ management styles, when attitudes and 
actions might be separate factors affecting corporate environmental performance.30  For 
example, the mere fact that a facility has implemented an ISO14001-compliant 
environmental management system (EMS) might itself lead to improvements in firms’ 
performance, such that the environmental impacts of firms with such EMSs tend to be 
                                                 
30 For a discussion of the difference between management commitment and performance, see Coglianese & 
Nash, supra note 28, at 16-18.  
13 
 
systematically more benign than comparable firms without such EMSs.  But there still 
could be differences among firms with EMSs, such that those firms with both an EMS 
and managers with strong, pro-environment attitudes perform still better.  As one 
participant with extensive experience in environmental management consulting noted, 
companies that implement EMSs because they want to manage themselves well will 
experience better results than companies that are pressured to implement EMSs. 
 Alternatively, it could be that implementing an EMS by itself makes no difference 
at all, and that firms with strong pro-environment attitudes improve their performance 
over firms without these attitudes, regardless of whether they have a formal EMS in 
place.  One participant posited that the presence of an EMS is merely “an epiphenomenon 
but not the ‘first cause’” of most firms’ performance improvements, suggesting that the 
same factors that motivate firms to implement an EMS could also motivate these firms to 
improve their environmental performance even without an EMS. 
 On the other hand, despite being well intentioned and having a strong commitment 
to the environment, many managers may be unable to make strides to reduce their firms’ 
environmental impacts without a formal environmental management system in place.  
Performance improvements may very well depend on the interaction of both attitudes and 
actions. 
Participants did not resolve the issue of the relative importance of attitudes versus 
actions, but the conference discussion did highlight the importance of this issue for those 
who are deciding whether to pursue management-based strategies.  After all, if the 
attitudes or commitment of managers matter most in affecting firms’ environmental 
performance, then simply requiring firms to implement certain management actions will 
14 
 
probably not lead to the expected performance improvements.  If managers need to 
change their attitudinal commitment in order for management to matter, it may be much 
harder to accomplish improved firm performance through types of management-based 
strategies.31
 
 The Impact of Management-Based Strategies 
Management-based strategies provide incentives for firms to engage in 
management actions or practices, but they do not necessarily seek to change managers’ 
attitudes.  Government regulators, trade associations, and community groups who seek to 
encourage or require firms to improve their environmental management cannot observe 
or measure attitudes nearly as easily as actions.  Management-based strategies therefore 
focus on rewarding or punishing firms based on their management practices.  What 
impact do strategies that seek to improve management practices ultimately have on firms’ 
environmental performance? 
 At the conference, presenters focused on the environmental impacts associated 
with management-based strategies, reporting findings from systematic studies aimed at 
assessing whether these strategies have had demonstrable effects on firms’ environmental 
                                                 
31 Although there may be reasons to believe that managers’ attitudes matter independent of certain actions, 
researchers face difficulties in measuring managers’ attitudes directly.  Since it will be socially acceptable 
for managers to proclaim their attitudinal commitment to environmental protection, no matter how 
important it really is to them, surveys and structured interviews with managers may not result in valid or 
accurate attitudinal measures.  Fine-grained content analysis of open-ended interview questions may result 
in better measures of attitudes.  Alternatively, one participant suggested that it is appropriate to take 
managers’ actions into account as a way of testing the validity of any attempt to ask managers about their 
attitudes.  Such an approach would use managers’ actions effectively as a way of approximating their 
revealed preferences about environmental protection.  Yet following such an approach, another participant 
noted, poses its own challenges.  Researchers seeking ultimately to untangle the separate effects of attitudes 
and actions would want to observe actions that reveal managers’ attitudes but do not correlate with 
environmental performance.  This will probably be difficult to do, since the actions of committed managers 
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performance.  Most of the innovative, management-based efforts at the center of these 
studies have been in existence for at least a decade, but until now have yet to receive any 
sustained empirical scrutiny.32  As a result, the empirical studies presented at the 
conference shed new light on a variety of prominent public and private initiatives 
developed over the last decade.  These studies include the following: 
 Lori Snyder Bennear of Duke University conducted an empirical evaluation of 
state laws requiring managers to develop pollution prevention plans.33  During the 
early 1990s, fourteen states implemented laws requiring industrial facilities to 
engage in planning to reduce their use of toxic chemicals.  From a theoretical 
perspective, Bennear demonstrated that management-based regulation could be 
effective at reducing toxic chemical releases both by changing the internal 
decision-making of the plant and through information sharing between regulated 
entities and the regulator.  Bennear also presented new empirical evidence 
demonstrating that plants subject to such management-based regulations have 
experienced greater reductions in toxic chemical releases than they would have in 
the absence of these regulatory initiatives.  She showed that facilities subject to 
these regulations reduced toxic chemicals by nearly 60,000 pounds more than 
comparable facilities not subject to the regulations.34 
 Richard N.L. Andrews of the University of North Carolina shared findings from a 
study of management-based mandates imposed by industrial customers on their 
                                                                                                                                                 
that lead to the largest improvements in environmental performance are likely to be the best signals of 
managers’ attitudes. 
32 Lori Snyder Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Evaluating Environmental Policies ENVIRONMENT 
(forthcoming 2005). 
33 Lori Snyder Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A Valuable Tool in the Regulatory 
Toolbox?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005). 
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suppliers.35  Andrews and his collaborators surveyed 3,200 manufacturing 
facilities in four sectors, comparing the self-reported environmental performance 
of facilities that adopted formal EMSs in order to comply with customer mandates 
with the self-reported performance of firms that were not subject to an EMS 
mandate and had not implemented one.36  Their survey results suggested that the 
mandates led to improved performance in some aspects of firms’ operations but 
not others.  Managers in companies that had implemented an EMS in response to 
a business mandate reported more improvements in energy use, recycling, and 
reductions in spills and leaks compared with managers in companies without an 
EMS.  No significant differences emerged, however, between companies in other 
aspects of environmental performance.37 
 Jason Scott Johnston of the University of Pennsylvania shared the results from an 
empirical study of the effectiveness of EPA’s Strategic Goals Program (SGP), a 
management-based voluntary program established between EPA and the metal 
finishing industry in 1998.38  SGP aimed to spur firms to adopt improved 
management practices and meet ambitious “beyond compliance” performance 
goals.  Although upwards of 300 firms joined SGP and demonstrated reductions 
in environmental impacts compared with a 1992 baseline, Johnston concluded 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Richard N.L. Andrews, et. al., Environmental Management Under Pressure: How Do Private Sector 
Mandates Affect Performance?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES 
FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE  (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 
2005). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Jason Scott Johnston, The Promise and Limits of Voluntary Management-Based Reform: An Analysis of 
EPA’s Strategic Goals Program, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES 
FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 
2005). 
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that the impact from the SGP program itself was at best limited.  SGP did help in 
disseminating information about pollution prevention throughout the sector, but 
many of the environmental improvements made by participating firms occurred 
before the program was launched in 1998.  Moreover, the program only attracted 
a small percentage of all the shops in the metal finishing sector.39 
 Tapas Ray and Kathleen Segerson of the University of Connecticut studied the 
impact of an EPA management-based effort called the Clean Charles Initiative.40  
In the Clean Charles project, government served as the standard-bearer of an 
ecosystem-wide performance management initiative that led to significant 
improvements in water quality on the Charles River in Boston.  Ray and Segerson 
showed how EPA’s efforts to focus management attention on water quality also 
brought greater focus to government inspections and enforcement actions, and 
they argued that these enforcement actions taken in response to the government’s 
goal setting played a major role in spurring improvements in environmental 
management and water quality.41 
 
 Overall, these results suggest the impacts of management-based strategies can vary 
from clearly positive to marginal to nonexistent.  Conference discussion focused on why 
these strategies might work at all in those cases where they do.  A key factor, according 
to several participants, lies with the information management-based strategies generate.  
Management-based strategies generally call upon firms to invest in the production of 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Tapas Ray & Kathleen Segerson, Clean Charles 2005 Initiative: Why the “Success”?, in LEVERAGING 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE  (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005). 
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information about the environmental risks created by their operations and about 
alternative mitigation measures, as well as to develop procedures for continued 
monitoring and information collection.  The information generated through management 
systems leads to behavioral change either by (a) providing feedback directly to decision 
makers within firms about ways to reduce potential liabilities, or (b) informing 
stakeholders who in turn bring pressure to bear upon the firms’ decision makers.42  
Several participants used the oft-used expression that “what gets measured, gets 
managed” to suggest that knowledge of any environmental problem is a necessary 
condition for managers to find a solution. 
 Management-based strategies seek to provide incentives for managers to invest in 
information gathering.  Without such incentives, firms may not always find it in their 
interest to gather the information they need to identify potential opportunities for 
environmental improvement, even when these opportunities might bring business 
advantages to the firm.43  This is because finding so-called win-win opportunities is not 
cost-free.  Even if the expected business benefits were positive, they might not be 
significant enough for managers to justify spending the time and resources needed to 
identify the win-win options in the first place.  When government agencies or customers 
either mandate planning or offer firms incentives to engage in such planning, firms more 
readily invest in the search for win-win opportunities.  Once firms undertake a search for 
information in response to these incentives, they will be inclined to implement those 
opportunities they find that both benefit the environment and their bottom line. 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Id. 
42 See Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (1995). 
43 Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6 at 703; see also Bennear, supra note 33, at 10. 
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 Conference discussions also examined why management-based strategies might 
not work as well as some would hope.  A key issue affecting the degree to which 
management-based strategies succeed in bringing about environmental improvement, 
according to many participants, is the adequacy of incentives.  Several participants 
stressed that behavioral change requires either changed attitudes or sufficient incentives, 
but they questioned whether management-based strategies could generate either.  Without 
changed attitudes or adequate incentives, firms may simply go through the motions by 
creating management systems that make little difference in terms of environmental 
outcomes.44
 Many participants agreed that the most significant environmental improvements 
depend upon large capital investments or markedly different business strategies.  They 
doubted whether any management-based strategy by itself could lead firms to make such 
major changes and suggested the need for government regulation to mandate the use of 
specific technologies or impose stringent performance standards that necessitate that 
firms make significant investments or changes in their business strategies.  Furthermore, 
many firms lack the capacity to make significant environmental improvements, 
regardless of the incentives available through management-based strategies.  Large, 
multinational firms often have the capacity to implement sophisticated and meaningful 
management systems, but similar progress probably cannot be expected of small-to-
                                                 
44 See Cary Coglianese, Policies to Promote Systematic Environmental Management, in REGULATING 
FROM THE INSIDE 181, 194 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001) (“Policies that merely increase 
the use of [management systems] may do little to encourage the sustained commitment needed for firms to 
make ongoing environmental improvements.”). 
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medium sized enterprises or businesses facing a high level of global competition or tight 
profit margins.45
 A few participants expressed skepticism about the efficacy of management-based 
strategies due to the reluctance of the private sector to make substantial investments in 
environmental protection.  One participant argued that private-sector initiatives, such as 
trade association codes of environmental management, are inherently weak because 
industry groups face collective action problems and have a tendency to promulgate 
management standards based on the lowest common denominator.  Another participant 
suggested that even government management-based initiatives have been watered down 
due to pressures from industry during implementation. 
 Finally, the costs of implementing management systems should not be overlooked; 
these costs are nontrivial.  For example, one participant surmised that complying with the 
paperwork requirements of the Clean Air Act’s risk management rule – a management-
based regulation – demands in the aggregate close to 100,000 hours of management time 
each year and costs tens of millions of dollars.46  A key question for future analysis will 
be whether the costs of generating information in response to management-based 
strategies are justified in light of the magnitude of environmental benefits that result.  
Ultimately, the net benefits of management-based strategies (that is, environmental 
benefits minus compliance costs) should be compared with the net benefits from 
                                                 
45 Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, Policy Options for Improving Environmental Management in the 
Private Sector, 44 ENVIRONMENT 9, 11, 16 (2002) (Environmental Management Systems in Small 
Businesses). 
46 For discussion and analysis of the amount of time and money invested in paperwork requirements, see 
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air Act Section 
112(r)(7), 60 Fed. Reg. 13,526, at 13541-45 (Mar. 13, 1995). 
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alternative environmental strategies, including the adoption of more conventional forms 
of regulation. 
 The conference discussion addressed several potential complications and 
challenges for researchers wishing to study the impact of management-based strategies.  
A few participants suggested that, absent large capital investments in pollution control 
technologies, the environmental improvements associated with systematic environmental 
management are likely to be marginal and spread across a variety of areas within a firm’s 
operations.  Consequently, researchers choosing a single measure of environmental 
performance may well fail to observe any dramatic impact from management-based 
strategies, even though the cumulative effect of the individual improvements made across 
all areas could be significant.  Similarly, several participants suggested that the impacts 
from management-based efforts would be less observable in the short-term, but more 
likely to occur over the longer term.  This is because information generated through 
improved management takes time to flow throughout a firm to product designers and 
process engineers, and consequently the most substantial effects from management 
systems may not occur until the next time the company develops a new product line or 
production process. 
 The results from the studies presented at the conference indicate that management-
based strategies do not always yield dramatic impacts.  However, even when 
management-based strategies do not result in observable changes in firms’ performance, 
this does not definitively resolve the larger question about the impact of management 
itself.  It could be possible either that firms have not fully responded to the strategies 
(perhaps due to insufficient incentives) or that these strategies have simply prompted 
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firms to adopt the wrong kind of management practices.  The variation in results from 
across the empirical studies suggests that the impact of management-based strategies may 
depend ultimately on the incentives they provide to firms to improve their environmental 
management as well as the way these strategies are designed. 
 
The Design of Management Systems 
As we have seen, management-based strategies do not represent a single approach 
but actually different kinds of efforts aimed at improving companies’ environmental 
management and performance.47  Although they share the purpose of fostering effective 
management, these strategies can differ along at least two major dimensions that we have 
described, either one of which could make a difference in the outcomes achieved.  
Whether the initiating institution is governmental or nongovernmental, and whether 
improved management is required or simply encouraged, will shape the ultimate impact 
of these management-based strategies.  In addition, participants at the conference 
identified a variety of other potentially relevant differences in the design of management-
based strategies.  These other design features include: 
• Planning versus Implementation.  Management-based strategies can 
encourage or require planning only (leaving it up to firms to decide on their 
own whether to implement some or all of their plans), or they can provide 
incentives for firms both to engage in planning and to implement their plans. 
• Types of Management Actions.  The types of actions required or encouraged 
by management-based strategies can vary.  For example, some management-
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based strategies call for employee training as part of the preferred 
management system, while others do not.  Some call for managers to establish 
goals consistent with clearly stated performance targets, while others do not 
stipulate performance targets expected from managers and their goals. 
• Specificity of Actions.  Expectations for planning and management actions can 
be general or specific.  For example, some state pollution prevention planning 
laws call for firms to do little more than adopt “appropriate” plans, while other 
management-based regulations call for firms to develop plans that meet 
detailed and extensive criteria. 
• Information Collection.  Different management-based strategies call for firms 
to collect different kinds of information.  In addition, there are differences in 
whether information and records are to be kept by the firms themselves, or 
whether they should be released to others, including the public or government. 
• Auditing.  The extent of any auditing, as well as the type of auditor, can vary.  
Since the incentives offered by different strategies are contingent on firms 
taking the specified management actions, some attention to auditing is needed.  
Verification that firms have taken the specified actions can be conducted 
frequently or infrequently, on an announced or unannounced basis, and by 
government or third-party auditors. 
• Stakeholder Involvement.  Sometimes firms are expected to engage with 
community or environmental groups as part of their environmental 
management process. 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 Cf. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 28, at 229 (noting that “EMSs represent a wide range of 
approaches”). 
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A key challenge in the development of management-based approaches to environmental 
policy will be to identify which of these design elements, or which combinations of these 
elements, yield the most successful outcomes under specific conditions.  In addition, 
when drawing inferences from empirical studies, the possible differences in the design of 
management-based strategies should also be taken into account.  Even though a research 
study may show that a particular strategy does (or does not) have an observable impact 
on firms’ environmental performance, it is possible that other strategies with different 
design elements will yield different results. 
 Participants posited three criteria or characteristics needed to make management-
based strategies effective.  First, the user of the strategy – such as government or a trade 
association – should have a clear goal in mind and communicate that goal to firms and 
other interested organizations.  The Clean Charles Initiative provides a good example 
because the EPA communicated a concrete goal of achieving fishable and swimmable 
water quality by 2005.48
Second, an effective strategy should be tied to metrics so that firms’ performance 
can be reliably measured and compared, both over time and across firms.  If the strategy 
calls for actions or outcomes that are stated too loosely or cannot be meaningfully 
verified, then the quality of firms’ management efforts will be difficult to assess for the 
purpose of granting a reward or imposing a punishment. 
Finally, to be effective, management-based strategies need to provide firms with 
adequate incentives to take appropriate management measures.  If the incentives are 
largely punitive, such as government fines or the revocation of a purchasing arrangement, 
                                                 
48 Ray & Segerson, supra note 40. 
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the threat that noncompliance will be identified and punished needs to be credible.  If the 
incentive takes the form of rewards, the benefits firms receive must be sufficient to 
induce firms to undertake serious environmental efforts.  As one participant put it, any 
carrots that are offered should also be the size of sticks – that is, their absolute value 
should be at least as large as that of applicable civil penalties in order to be effective. 
 
Involvement of Third Parties in Environmental Management 
The role for so-called stakeholder involvement in management-based strategies 
generated considerable discussion.49  Many conference participants called for a larger 
role for external stakeholders in the design and review of firms’ environmental 
management systems.  These groups could help ensure that managers assess their firms’ 
environmental impacts appropriately, set reasonable objectives and targets, devote an 
appropriate level of resources to implementing and maintaining the system, and put into 
place effective mechanisms to identify and correct performance problems.  Some 
participants argued that involvement by community officials and organizations in a firm’s 
environmental management could deliver important, but perhaps intangible, value to 
businesses.  Another participant stated that private-sector managers appear increasingly 
to be open to involving external stakeholders in their environmental management.  
Management-based strategies that seek to institutionalize community involvement may 
succeed in creating ways to keep the pressure on firms to make continuous 
improvements. 
                                                 
49 For related discussion of the role of stakeholder or community group involvement, see Robert Kagan et. 
al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW  & 
SOC. INQUIRY 307; IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITHE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992). 
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A number of participants pointed to limitations in relying on stakeholder 
involvement.  One set of problems involves identifying stakeholders:  Who are the 
stakeholders for any given industrial facility?  How should firms identify a complete or 
balanced group of stakeholders?  One participant wondered whether the challenges 
associated with identifying all the relevant stakeholders would even require the creation 
of an “administrative law at the level of the firm,” whereby firms provide public notice of 
changes to their management plans and provide opportunities for outsiders to comment 
on these plans. 
A further problem is that community and environmental organizations often lack 
the resources to make a meaningful contribution to companies’ development and 
implementation of management systems.50  Local groups often lack sufficient technical 
expertise about industrial operations, and the large, national environmental organizations 
that possess greater expertise lack the organizational presence and staffing needed to help 
design and monitor the management at facilities across the country.  Furthermore, one 
participant from industry noted that the experts in environmental groups seldom express 
much interest in management per se, tending instead to focus their efforts directly on 
facilities’ environmental performance or the adoption of specific pollution control 
technologies. 
A paper by Andrew King, of Dartmouth’s Tuck School of Business, highlighted a 
final problem with stakeholder involvement.51  King acknowledged that environmental 
organizations could bring value to industry efforts to adopt innovative approaches to 
                                                 
50 ALFRED A. MARCUS, ET. AL., REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
LESSONS FROM PROJECT XL (2002). 
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environmental management, particularly by signaling to others that a company’s efforts 
are responsible.  This signaling function could be particularly valuable for certain kinds 
of environmental risks that lack clear technological fixes or performance measures (at 
least short of a catastrophe).  After all, what constitutes good management will often not 
be clear to an outside observer, such as a regulator or trade association, so the existence 
of stakeholder involvement in a firm’s environmental management lends credibility to 
that firm’s efforts.  However, King argued that the same reason stakeholders provide this 
credibility – namely that their interests are not aligned with those of industry – also limits 
the degree to which companies may be willing to involve them in their management.52  In 
particular, King emphasized that environmental organizations have an interest in seeing 
innovative industrial practices adopted at one firm diffuse throughout an industry, while 
businesses’ interests generally lie in keeping information about their operations from 
their competitors.53
 A related issue in designing management-based strategies centers on the auditing 
of firms’ management practices.54  Stakeholder involvement may lend some credibility to 
a firm’s management efforts, but if firms are to be rewarded for adopting certain 
management practices, or punished for not doing so, it will be necessary to know which 
firms have acted in ways meriting reward or punishment.  Who will conduct needed 
audits?  Many participants questioned whether government agencies have sufficient 
                                                                                                                                                 
51 See Andrew King, The Role of Management Systems in Stakeholder Partnerships, in LEVERAGING THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE  
(Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005). 
52 Id. 
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54 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THIRD PARTY AUDITING OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: U.S. REGISTRATION PRACTICES FOR ISO 14001 (May 2001), available at 
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resources and personnel for auditing and suggested that third-party auditing be 
considered. 
Howard Kunreuther, Shelley Metzenbaum, and Peter Schmeidler presented a 
paper investigating the potential for linking mandatory insurance with private 
inspections.55  Insurers have incentives to conduct inspections of firms in order to make 
premium ratings and reduce claims.  To a much greater extent than other third-party 
auditors, who are normally paid for their services by the audited firm, insurance 
companies have a strong interest in reducing risks.  Furthermore, the costs of the 
inspections would be paid for in the premiums firms pay, thus providing a way to 
overcome the government’s resource constraints.  Kunreuther, Metzenbaum, and 
Schmeidler propose that pilot studies be undertaken to assess the impact of mandatory 
insurance on specific environmental, health, or safety problems.56  They conclude that a 
mandatory insurance problem would not necessarily substitute for, or eliminate the need 
for, conventional regulation and government inspections, but it could offer a complement 
to them.57
 
Management-Based Strategies and Conventional Regulation 
 The ultimate question surrounding management-based strategies is when to use 
them.  Where do they fit into the existing array of policies and strategies for 
environmental protection?  More specifically, what is their relationship to conventional 
                                                 
55 See Howard Kunreuther et. al., Private Inspections and Management Insurance for Managing Safety and 
Environmental Risks, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR 
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE  (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., forthcoming 2005). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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regulation?58  Participants argued that management-based strategies can be used both to 
help firms come into full compliance with existing regulations as well as to take steps 
that go beyond compliance with these regulations.  In addition, some suggested that 
management-based strategies will on occasion be appropriate alternatives to conventional 
regulation. 
 Management-based strategies can lead firms to improve their compliance with 
conventional technology and performance-based regulations by encouraging them to 
identify the regulations they are subject to and develop plans to come into and maintain 
compliance.  Such compliance management systems often include regular, internal audits 
to identify and correct instances of noncompliance.  One participant described 
management systems as an “insurance policy” for firms, while another explained that the 
firms he works with adopt environmental management systems to avoid being “struck by 
lightening” when the government inspectors come to pay a visit.  Other participants, 
though, expressed doubts about how important environmental management systems are 
for ensuring compliance.  For example, the study presented at the conference by Richard 
N.L. Andrews of the University of North Carolina found no significant differences in the 
reported levels of compliance between firms with and without management systems, 
suggesting that firms can come into compliance even when they do not have formal 
environmental management systems in place.59
 Management systems can be used by companies to identify ways of reducing 
environmental impacts not currently addressed by government regulation.  For example, 
the same study presented by Andrews found that the presence of management systems 
                                                 
58 EPA, EPA’S STRATEGY FOR DETERMINING THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN 
REGULATORY PROGRAMS (April 12, 2004). 
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correlated with significant improvements in reported environmental impacts on 
unregulated aspects of business – such as avoiding spills or conserving energy – but not 
on regulated aspects such as air and water emissions.60  These findings suggest the 
possibility that management-based strategies may be especially suited for environmental 
problems that call for improved operational management and internal coordination – 
problems that may be difficult to address through conventional regulatory strategies. 
 Management-based strategies implemented in the United States over the last 
decade have all been implemented against the backdrop of extensive government 
regulation.  Several participants believed that management-based strategies will only 
work (or will work best) when they have a credible regulatory threat operating in the 
background.  For example, the study by Jason Scott Johnston of the University of 
Pennsylvania suggested that firms in the metal finishing industry were motivated to 
participate in the Strategic Goals Program in order to preempt the adoption of tougher 
water pollution regulations that EPA had proposed in 1995.61  Government agencies can 
also use the existence of burdensome conventional regulation to offer rewards – namely, 
waivers from existing regulations – to firms that demonstrate responsible environmental 
management.62
 Although environmental regulation has long been said to have many problems, 
participants pointed out that management-based strategies have their own problems, some 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 Andrews, supra note 35. 
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61 Johnston, supra note 38.  See generally Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Maxwell, “Voluntary” 
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INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY.  (Maurizio Franzini and Antonio Nicita eds., 2002); Kathleen 
Segerson and Thomas J. Miceli, Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for 
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of which might be worse than those associated with conventional regulation.  One 
fundamental concern was that these new strategies, especially when they take the form of 
government requirements for certain management processes, might intrude into the core 
of business decision making.  Putting management into private hands is, after all, what a 
free enterprise system is all about.  Government-imposed standards on environmental 
management could be too rigid and inflexible, especially in the face of changing 
conditions in global markets. 
 Some suggested that management is too difficult a matter for government to try to 
influence.  Good management involves much more than a flowchart or set of procedures 
that exists on paper.  Instead, it reflects the dynamics of organizations made up of people 
and their relationships with each other.  Even the most informed government officials 
will not be as well-situated as private sector managers to know the best way to manage 
businesses to return a profit and minimize impact on the environment.  Moreover, 
government itself is far from unified, so the possibility exists that different agencies could 
require duplicative or incompatible management steps. 
 Other participants thought that requiring or encouraging firms to adopt 
management systems could hardly do much harm, especially if they do not call for the 
adoption of any new technologies or compliance with more stringent performance 
standards.  However, these same participants also wondered whether management 
systems would do much good.  Even though several empirical studies presented at the 
conference show that management-based strategies can lead to environmental 
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improvements,63 the substantive significance of these improvements needs to be 
considered.  Whether the benefits achieved are worth the costs that they impose on 
economic activity has yet to be determined.  One participant argued that if there are 
problems with conventional regulation, the solution should be to fix those problems – not 
to expect that management-based strategies will make up for the shortcomings of the 
existing regulatory system.  Another participant expressed concern that attention to 
management-based strategies could be used to preempt other regulatory interventions that 
would better serve society.64
 In making decisions about management-based strategies, decision makers should 
take into account the full range of possible impacts these strategies may generate.  For 
example, one participant suggested that one of the unintended consequences of trade 
association mandates has been that numerous marginal firms leave those trade 
associations that have imposed such mandates.  A similar effect may also arise with 
government programs when firms take actions to bring their use of specified chemicals 
below levels that trigger the imposition of management-based regulation – even if doing 
so does not lower substantially their overall level of environmental risk.65  To address 
these kinds of side effects, management-based strategies should probably be combined 
with other efforts by government, trade associations, and community groups to keep 
firms shifting their operations off the radar screen. 
A final concern with management-based strategies focused on issues of equity -- 
both from the standpoint of the public as well as of industry itself.  For the public, the 
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flexibility inherent in a management-based approach may mean that the same types of 
facilities could emit different levels of pollution in different locales.  Although 
conventional regulation may be criticized for taking a one-size-fits-all approach, uniform 
technology- or performance-based standards at least are uniform.  For business, there is a 
separate equity concern, namely that government inspectors and others who oversee 
management-based programs will apply management standards in inconsistent or 
inequitable ways.  If what counts as good management is not clearly specified, this will 
give discretion to auditors and may result in an uneven application of sanctions or 
rewards.66
Equity issues also arise from the distinction between actions and attitudes.  
Management-based strategies work by discriminating between firms based on whether 
they have in place certain easily observable management practices, and consequently 
these strategies will be vulnerable to criticism that firms are selected for reward or 
punishment based on the wrong criteria.  Some firms may be rewarded simply because 
they go through the motions of adopting a management system, while other firms that are 
really making a difference in reducing pollution could go unrewarded because they lack 
the requisite formalities in their management practices. 
Participants recognized that management-based strategies have both advantages 
and disadvantages.  As such, no participant advocated eliminating the existing system of 
environmental regulation altogether in favor of adopting only management-based 
strategies.  Rather, the challenge for decision makers will be to find the optimal 
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intervention for the specific problems and circumstances they confront.  In some cases, 
the best option will be to continue to rely on conventional regulatory strategies.  Yet in 
other cases, as some of the research papers and conference discussion suggested, there 
will be good reason to consider using a management-based strategy.  Management-based 
strategies may be particularly useful in order to influence the practices of a highly diverse 
set of facilities, collect information that will help motivate private sector managers or 
activate influential stakeholders, or improve performance among facilities or with respect 
to specific problems that are simply not amenable to other regulatory approaches.67
 
Conclusion 
 Management-based strategies are increasingly gaining the attention of leaders in 
both the public and private sectors.  These strategies can take many forms, but they are 
linked by their emphasis on improving management and thereby seeking to contribute 
indirectly to improved environmental outcomes.  They hold out the promise that firms 
will gather information needed to improve their environmental performance – and that 
they will respond to their acquisition of this information by reducing or preventing 
pollution.  By providing incentives for firms to identify their own risks and select their 
own mitigation solutions, management-based strategies are flexible and seek to use the 
private sector’s informational advantage for the public good. 
The research presented at the Regulatory Policy Program’s conference suggests 
that, while still relatively new and unstudied, management-based strategies may 
sometimes have a role to play in environmental protection.  Management style does 
                                                 
67 See generally Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 6; Bennear, supra note 33. 
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appear to shape the environmental performance of firms, so strategies that influence 
private sector management can be considered at least plausible candidates for bringing 
about environmental improvements.  The studies presented at the conference have broken 
new ground by empirically investigating the impact of management-based strategies.  
Some, but not all, of these studies confirm that management-based strategies can 
contribute to reductions in pollution.  Of course, the overall impact of any strategy 
depends on a variety of factors, including the incentives it provides to firms to make 
improvements and the type of environmental problem being addressed. 
The research presented at the conference adds to an emerging body of empirical 
knowledge about public and private sector strategies to leverage managers’ efforts to 
improve environmental conditions.  The conference discussion summarized in this article 
has highlighted both the advantages and disadvantages of management-based strategies, 
so that decision makers can have realistic expectations about what these strategies will be 
able to achieve.  While improvements in environmental management can produce some 
results, this does not mean that the results will always be dramatic nor does it mean that 
management-based strategies will be appropriate for all problems. 
Further research will be needed to inform decision makers interested in 
management-based strategies.  As one participant argued, just as medicine has moved 
toward evidence-based practice, so too should environmental policy move closer toward 
evidence-based decision making through greater reliance on empirical research.68  By 
bringing together leading researchers with key public and private sector leaders to discuss 
                                                 
68 See Cary Coglianese and Lori Snyder Bennear, Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies: Toward 
Evidence-Based Decision Making, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PANEL ON SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE PRIORITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING  (Garry D. Brewer and Paul C. Stern eds., 
forthcoming 2005). 
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a variety of new empirical studies, the Regulatory Policy Program’s conference has shed 
light on an emerging approach toward environmental protection and provided a 
foundation upon which future research can be based. 
37 
 
Appendix 
 
Conference Participants 
 
 
Richard N.L. Andrews 
Professor of Environmental Policy 
University of North Carolina 
 
R. Darryl Banks 
Senior Fellow 
New America Foundation 
 
Max H. Bazerman 
Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business 
Administration 
Harvard University Business School 
 
Alex Beehler 
Program Officer, Environment 
Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation 
 
Christopher Bell 
Partner  
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP 
 
Jay Benforado 
Director, National Center for Environmental 
Innovation 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
Bernard Cahill 
Program Assistant 
Regulatory Policy Program 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
Harvard University 
 
Leslie Carothers 
President 
Environmental Law Institute 
Vice President, Environment, Health and Safety 
United Technologies Corporation (retired) 
 
Don R. Clay 
Managing Director 
Environmental and Regulatory Affairs 
Koch Industries, Inc.  
 
Cary Coglianese 
Associate Professor of Public Policy 
Chair, Regulatory Policy Program 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
Harvard University 
 
 
 
James Connaughton 
Chairman 
Council on Environmental Quality 
The White House 
 
Terry Davies 
Senior Fellow 
Resources for the Future 
 
Daniel Edwards Jr. 
Graduate Research Assistant 
Department of Public Policy 
University of North Carolina 
 
E. Donald Elliott 
Partner & Head, Environment Department 
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher 
Professor (Adjunct) of Law 
Yale Law School 
 
Ira Feldman 
President & Senior Counsel 
Greentrack Strategies 
 
Daniel Fiorino 
Director 
Performance Incentives Division 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Beth Graves 
EMS Project Coordinator 
North Carolina Department of Environmental 
Protection  
Division of Pollution Prevention and 
Environmental Assistance 
 
Bill Hanson 
Associate Director, Office of Business and 
Community Innovation 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
 
John A. Harris 
Program Manager-EHS Planning & 
Development 
Ashland Chemical Company
38 
 
Winston Hickox 
Secretary 
California Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Jeffrey R. Holmstead 
Assistant Administrator 
Office of Air & Radiation 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Andrew M. Hutson 
Research Assistant & Doctoral Student 
University of North Carolina 
 
Jason Scott Johnston 
Director, Program on Law & the Environment 
Robert G. Fuller Jr. Professor of Public Law 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 
Robert A. Kagan 
Professor of Law & Political Science 
Director, Center for the Study of Law & Society 
University of California – Berkeley 
 
Charles W. Kent 
Director 
Office of Business and Community Innovation 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Robert L. Kerr 
Kerr, Greiner & Associates, Inc. 
 
Andrew King 
Associate Professor of Business Administration 
Tuck School of Business 
Dartmouth College 
 
Paul Kleindorfer 
Professor of Decision Sciences, Economics and 
Business 
Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Debra Knopman 
Associate Director 
Rand Science and Technology 
 
Kalpana Kotagal 
Research Assistant 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Howard Kunreuther 
Cecilia Yen Koo Professor of Decision Sciences 
& Business & Public Policy 
Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
Michael Lenox 
Associate Professor of Management 
Fuqua School of Business 
Duke University 
 
Leslie H. Lowe 
Program Director, Energy & Environment 
Interfaith Council on Corporate Responsibility 
 
Mindy Lubber 
Executive Director 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economics (CERES) 
 
Thomas Lyon 
Professor of Business Economics 
Kelley School of Business 
Indiana University 
 
Shelley H. Metzenbaum 
Visiting Professor 
University of Maryland 
 
Robert P. Minicucci, II 
EMS Project Manager 
New Hampshire Department of Environmental 
Services 
 
Jason Morrison 
Director, Economic Globalization and the 
Environment Program 
Pacific Institute 
 
Jennifer Nash 
Director, Regulatory Policy Program 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
Harvard University 
 
Ulku G. Oktem 
Adjunct Associate Professor 
Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Debra Phillips 
Team Leader, Responsible Care 
American Chemistry Council 
 
Edwin Pinero 
Deputy Federal Environmental Executive 
Office of the Federal Environmental Executive 
 
Paul Portney 
President and Senior Fellow 
Resources for the Future 
 
39 
 
Jeff Smoller Tapas K. Ray 
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Natural 
Resources 
Graduate Assistant & Doctoral Student 
University of Connecticut 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources  
 Don Reisman 
Lori Snyder Bennear Director, RFF Press 
Assistant Professor Resources for the Future 
Nicholas School of Environment and Earth 
Sciences 
 
Christian M. Richter 
Duke University Principal 
 The Policy Group, LLC 
Robert Stephens  
Assistant Secretary for Environmental 
Management and Sustainability 
Daniel Roczniak 
Director, Implementation & Performance 
California Environmental Protection Agency American Chemistry Council 
  
Eric Svenson David W. Ronald 
Director, Corporate Issues Management Executive Director 
Public Service Electric & Gas Services Corp. Multi-State Working Group 
  
William L. Thomas, Esq. Susan Rose-Ackerman 
Senior Attorney, Office of Compliance 
Assurance 
Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence 
Yale Law School 
Pillsbury Winthrop LLP  
 William G. Rosenberg 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr. Senior Fellow 
Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural 
Resources Law and Vice Dean 
Center for Business and Government 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
Stanford Law School Harvard University 
  
John Walke Lynn Scarlett 
Director, Clean Air Programs Assistant Secretary, Policy, Management, & 
Budget Natural Resources Defense Council 
 U.S. Department of the Interior 
Peter Wise  
Principal Peter J. Schmeidler 
Kestrel Management Senior Research Fellow 
 Wharton School 
George Wyeth University of Pennsylvania 
Director, Policy & Program Change Division  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Kathleen Segerson 
 Department Head and Director of Graduate 
Studies Terry Yosie 
Vice President, Responsible Care Department of Economics 
American Chemistry Council University of Connecticut 
  
Larry Yuspeh Betsy Shaw 
Director of Research & Development Director, Office of Environmental Policy 
Innovation Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation 
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Jon Silberman 
Senior Attorney 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
40 
 
 
About the Authors 
 
 
Cary Coglianese 
 
Cary Coglianese is currently Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  He is also Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy 
School of Government and Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program at the School’s Center for 
Business and Government.  His interdisciplinary research focuses on issues of regulation and 
administrative law, with a particular emphasis on the empirical evaluation of alternative and 
innovative regulatory strategies and the role of disputing and negotiation in regulatory policy 
making.  His work has appeared in, among other journals, the Administrative Law Review, Duke 
Law Journal, Law & Society Review, Michigan Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, and Stanford Law Review.  His book, Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental 
Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? (co-edited with Jennifer Nash), was the first to 
examine the policy implications of emerging trends in private sector environmental management.  
He is the founder and co-chair of the Law & Society Association’s international collaborative 
research network on regulatory governance, the vice-chair of the e-rule-making committee of the 
American Bar Association’s Administrative and Regulatory Practice Section, and the vice-chair of 
the Committee on Innovation, Management Systems, and Trading of the American Bar 
Association’s Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources.  At the Kennedy School and the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Coglianese teaches public law, environmental law and 
policy, and regulatory strategy.  As the Irvine Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, 
he also taught legislation.  He is a recipient of a Resources for the Future fellowship in regulatory 
implementation and the American Political Science Association's Edward S. Corwin Award for 
his research on environmental litigation.  He received his J.D., M.P.P., and Ph.D. from the 
University of Michigan and is a member of the bar of the State of Michigan and the United States 
Supreme Court. 
 
 
Jennifer Nash 
 
Jennifer Nash is Director of the Regulatory Policy Program at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University.  She conducts empirical research on emerging trends in 
government regulation and industry self-regulation.  She has published widely on a variety of 
environmental management and policy topics in journals such as: Administrative Law Review; 
Business, Strategy and the Environment; Environment; Annual Review of Energy and the 
Environment; and the California Management Review.  Her two books, Leveraging the Private 
Sector: Management-Based Strategies for Improving Environmental Performance (forthcoming 
2005) and Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy 
Goals? (2001), both co-edited with Cary Coglianese, examine ways to improve private sector 
environmental management.  Her current research explores the effectiveness of performance- and 
management-based regulatory strategies in achieving policy goals, and the role of voluntary 
programs in improving the environmental performance of firms. 
